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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops a decision theoretic model rooted in Markov decision 
process theory to provide military and diplomacy decision makers with insights 
regarding the interests and potential strategies of Lebanese Hizbullah.  State 
trees are used to capture the interests and actions of Lebanese Hizbullah and 
other relevant countries, political organizations or group.  These state trees are 
used to design an influence diagram that maps the interdependencies of all 
interests, actions and players.  A Visual Basic for Applications tool was 
developed for the user to generate the sets of data necessary to populate and 
solve the model’s influence diagram.  The actions and interests of Lebanese 
Hizbullah, over time, in the influence diagram constitute a dynamic Bayesian 
network.  At each stage of this dynamic process, Lebanese Hizbullah is 
characterized by a state and a set of feasible actions that, depending on the 
actions taken, determine the transition into a new state of the system.  This 
dynamic dependency-bearing model identifies the most important interests, 
priorities, and capabilities of Lebanese Hizbullah.  The resulting assessment of 
Lebanese Hizbullah’s influence, investment, capabilities, and actions reveal key 
cause-and-effect relations.  The utility of such insights may enable decision 
makers to determine material variables and best courses of action to enhance 
their strategic decision-making capabilities. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Actions: Applications of a stakeholder’s resources that (may) influence the state 
of one or more stakeholders.  The set of feasible actions may depend on 
the state of the system. 
Base Case Scenario: A reasonable approximation of values associated with a 
model’s interests and distributions.  The Base Case Scenario is not 
intended to be a perfect prediction of the future, but rather a point of 
reference by which subsequent models can be compared and even 
derived for the purposes of both general and sensitivity analysis. 
Bayesian Network: A probabilistic model that represents a set of random 
variables and their conditional independencies via a directed acyclic 
graph. 
Chance: A variable whose outcome is uncertain.  The decision maker cannot 
control it directly. 
Controlling Lebanon: The degree to which LH possesses ideological, social, or 
political control of Lebanese affairs. 
Decision: A variable that a stakeholder, as the decision maker, has the power to 
control. 
Defending Lebanon: The degree to which LH is perceived as having the 
capability and intent to apply military and violent actions toward defending 
interests of  the Lebanese population against threats, especially those 
originating from Israel. 
Diplomacy/Economic/Financial Actions: Negotiations between two stakeholders 
that frame a range for future economic or financial actions. 
Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN): A Bayesian network that represents a time-
series sequence of variables (see Bayesian Network and Hidden Markov 
Model). 
Engage Syria: Form diplomatic, political, or economic relationships with Syria. 
Engages Economically: Negotiations leading to the development of economic 
programs or aid to realize internal or external foreign policy objectives. 
Exogenous Support: Stakeholders that influence a system indirectly through their 
support or influence on a primary stakeholder.  Exogenous support is 
modeled as chance nodes to simplify the model and avoid type III error. 
 xvi
Forecast (Success/Failure): An estimate, based on historical data and 
experience, of the result of a future event. 
Functionalism: The anthropological thought and application of game theory that 
holds that customs, institutions or behavior patterns in a society can be 
interpreted as functional responses to problems which the society faces. 
GeNIe: GeNIe is a development environment for building graphical decision-
theoretic models. It has been developed at the Decision Systems 
Laboratory, University of Pittsburgh. It is freeware that had been made 
available to the community to promote decision-theoretic methods in 
decision support systems.  It has been used in both academic and 
commercial applications. Its name originates from the name Graphical 
Network Interface, the original name given to a much simpler interface to 
SMILE—a larger library of functions for graphical probabilistic and 
decision-theoretic models. GeNIe is an outer shell to SMILE.  GeNIe is 
implemented in Visual C++ and draws heavily on the MFC (Microsoft 
Foundation Classes).  Models of any size and complexity can be built, 
limited only by the capacity of the operating memory of the computer on 
which it operated.  
Hidden Markov Model (HMM): A statistical model in which the system being 
modeled is assumed to be a Markov process with unobserved state. An 
HMM can be considered as the simplest dynamic Bayesian network.  In a 
regular Markov model, the state is directly visible to the observer, and 
therefore the state transition probabilities are the only parameters. In a 
hidden Markov model, the state is not directly visible, but output 
dependent on the state is visible. Each state has a probability distribution 
over the possible output tokens. Therefore, the sequence of tokens 
generated by a HMM gives some information about the sequence of 
states. The adjective 'hidden' refers to the state sequence through which 
the model passes, not to the parameters of the model; even if the model 
parameters are known exactly, the model is still 'hidden'. 
Information/Intelligence Actions: Use of propaganda, doctrine and intelligence 
gathering capabilities. 
Interests: Issues, goals and objectives that a stakeholder cares about.  Interests 
are discretized into 2-3 levels of importance. The interests are shown as 
Diamonds in the influence diagrams. 
Markov Decision Process (MDP): A time-varying stochastic process, which has a 
discrete (finite or countable) state-space.  A decision maker may choose 
any action available which then randomly moves the system to a new 
state where the decision maker may choose any action available in the 
new state or receive a corresponding reward. 
 xvii
Military Strike: Pursue military option aimed at reducing threat capability.  Military 
strike options not specified, but could include Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, or 
militant Palestinian groups (such as Hamas). 
Military/Law Enforcement: Demonstration or application of violence, either 
internal or external, to achieve the actor’s interests. 
Payoff: Associated to each possible outcome of the model is a collection of 
numerical payoffs, one to each stakeholder.  These payoffs represent the 
value of the outcome to the different stakeholders (Straffin, 2006). 
Political/Diplomatic Focus: Exercise influence primarily through emphasis of 
political participation in Lebanon’s government and de-emphasis on the 
role of LH’s “resistance” militia.  
Protect/Svc Shia: The degree to which LH is perceived as having the capability 
and intent to provide for the welfare of the Lebanese population.  This 
capability is derived from its ability to provide social services such as 
hospitals, schools, etc. toward improving the status and livelihood of the 
Shia, in particular, and other Lebanese citizens, in general. 
Rational Choice Theory: A stakeholder reasons before taking any action to meet 
specific interests while maximizing payoff.  Assuming rationality means we 
expect stakeholders to choose actions based on probabilistic forecasts 
that analyze their payoff as the system transitions to its next state.  
Rational stakeholders seek to strategically maximize their expected utility. 
Regional Influence:  The degree to which an actor’s (in this case Syria) ability to 
shape regional economic, military, or diplomatic parameters to suit its 
interests improves (or degrades). 
Regional Stability: Increasing or decreasing the degree to which the region is 
absent of chaos and disorder, as these conditions are viewed as contrary 
to Israel’s interests. 
Resisting Israel: The degree to which LH is perceived as bearing the “mantle of 
resistance” against its sworn enemy Israel, using any means at its 
disposal (from propaganda to terrorism) to actively oppose any Israeli 
action that might be contrary to the interests of Lebanese Shia, other 
Lebanese citizens, or Arabs in general. 
Reward: A quantitative criterion, which in the context of this thesis, stakeholders 
are trying to maximize. 
Salience: The degree to which a stakeholder will apply finite resources to achieve 
its interests—it is how much a stakeholder cares about the outcome of the 
political/military situation. 
 xviii
Shocks: Events that have a significant impact on the outcome of the situation. 
Shocks may be triggered by stakeholders’ actions or by external events 
(e.g., nature, non stakeholder entities, etc).  
Stakeholders: Countries, political organizations, or groups that play a key role in 
the evolution and outcome of a political/military situation. 
State of the System: The union of the current states of the stakeholders. 
State Space of the System: The set of all possible states of the system. 
State Space: The set of all possible states of a stakeholder.   
State: An array of interests along with their levels of importance.  Each unique 
interest/level combination represents a unique state of an actor.  For 
example:  In the case of Israel, improving security AND increasing 
regional stability would represent its ideal state (i.e. utility value=100) while 
deteriorating security and decreasing regional stability would represent the 
least favored state (i.e. utility value = 0). 
State Tree: A vertical depiction of a stakeholder’s set interests and the 
associated utility values of all feasible combinations of interests.  
Sometimes called expected utility models.   
Subject Matter Expert (SME): A person who is an expert in a particular area.  In 
this thesis, the SMEs were anthropologists, historians, economists, 
mathematicians, military experts and diplomats specializing in Middle 
Eastern affairs from the UCC. 
Success: Achieving a desirable result commensurate with the resources 
expended. 
System: A model of the organizational structure in a political situation. 
t=t+1: ‘t’ indicates the current time period.  ‘t+1’ indicates the next time period.   
An arrow with this expression indicates a time dependency relationship.  
The condition of the “head node” at time t+1 depends on the condition of 
the “tail node” at time t. 
Tornado Diagram: A style of plot that shows the relative importance of variables 
particularly useful in sensitivity analysis.  The ‘sensitive variable’ is 
modeled as uncertain or varying while all other variables remain constant 
according to their assigned base case value. 
 xix
Type III Error: Typically known as asking the wrong question and using the wrong 
null hypothesis.  We extend the definition of Type III error to mean the 
error of having solved the wrong problem... when one should have solved 
the right problem" or "the error... [of] choosing the wrong problem 
representation... when one should have... chosen the right problem 
representation" (Mitroff and Silvers, 2009). 
Unified Combatant Command: A United States joint military command that is 
composed of forces from two or more services that are organized with 
either a geographical or functional basis. 
Value: A relative measure of the importance of a certain outcome to a 
stakeholder; it is a function of the interests achieved in a particular 
situation. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Models of political stakeholders that capture their influence, investment, 
capabilities and actions can help understand key relationships in complex 
situations such as war, terrorism, coercion, and political power shifts.  These 
insights enable governments, like the U.S., to shape how friendly and adversarial 
behaviors evolve over time by identifying key variables and best courses of 
action to enhance strategic decision-making capabilities. 
In this thesis, we develop a decision theoretic model to answer a question 
posed by a Unified Combatant Command: “Will Lebanese Hizbullah decrease its 
use of internal/external violence to attempt to become a larger part of the political 
process?”  We begin our decision-analysis approach by identifying the set of 
stakeholders, their interests and feasible actions.  The literature reviewed and 
opinions of subject-matter experts regarding Lebanese Hizbullah provide a 
design for the model, which contains five interests and eight feasible actions.  
Lebanese Hizbullah’s interests are to:  1) protect and provide services to the 
Shi’a throughout Lebanon; 2) possess and maintain a militia capability; 3) resist 
Israel; 4) defend Lebanon; and 5) control Lebanon.  Lebanese Hizbullah’s 
actions are to: 1) develop a closer relationship with Iran; 2) increase political 
maneuvering; 3) increase outreach to the Lebanese Diaspora; 4) expand goods 
and services beyond the Shi’a in Lebanon; 5) provoke or attack Israel; 6) 
increase illicit actions; 7) sponsor or conduct a terrorist attack; and 8) increase 
support to Hamas. 
State trees, which are similar to decision trees, are used to capture the 
order and assigned value of each combination of Lebanese Hizbullah’s interests.  
These hierarchal relationships are then incorporated in the design of an influence 
diagram.  An influence diagram represents the probabilistic and temporal 
dependencies associated the model components.  Influence Diagrams model the 
stakeholders decision situation and capture actions, state transitions, and 
 
 xxii
rewards.  Future rewards and the successive state of the system are 
conditionally independent of all previous states and actions (a property of 
Markovian Decision Processes). 
Lebanese Hizbullah is the influence diagram’s main stakeholder and sole 
decision maker.  Our subject matter experts identify the model’s secondary 
participants as being the Lebanese Diaspora and the Lebanese populace.   The 
interaction of interests, investment, capabilities, and actions of the stakeholder 
and secondary participants identify the temporal relationships that provide the 
basis for the dynamic model’s implementation in computer software.  The 
addition of time as an element in our model makes the full implementation of the 
system a Dynamic Bayesian Network.  Each period of time in the model 
represents one year.  The model evaluates Lebanese Hizbullah over a three-year 
period.  A software tool, scripted in VBA and named DMAPS: A Dynamic Model 
for the Analysis of Political Stakeholders, provides a user-interface to populate 
the model’s parameters and calculates the values necessary to solve the 
dynamic model. 
We examine three scenarios in this thesis.  In each scenario, we perform 
sensitivity analysis by changing the values associated with Lebanese Hizbullah’s 
interests or the distributions associated with its actions.  In the first scenario, 
interests and actions are based on data provided by subject matter experts.  The 
resulting optimal strategy is to “provoke or attack Israel” in year one, “increase 
illicit activities” in year two, and “seek to develop a closer relationship with Iran” in 
year three.  This remained the optimal strategy for all but one alternative 
examined in the sensitivity analysis.  The sensitivity analysis performed for the 
first scenario identifies “Lebanese Hizbullah’s interest of protecting and providing 
services to the Shi’a throughout Lebanon” as the most important variable—an 
interest that the U.S. could influence in order to engineer a more favorable 
environment in the Middle East. 
 
 xxiii
The second scenario differs from the first scenario by valuing the interests 
equally.  In this case Lebanese Hizbullah’s interest in “possessing a militia 
capability” and “protecting and providing services to the Shi’a in Lebanon” are the 
most sensitive to variations, i.e., U.S. influence. 
In the third scenario, the values of the interests are returned to their 
subject matter expert values in scenario one, however the distributions 
associated with Lebanese Hizbullah’s actions are varied.  Under these 
conditions, the interest of “Lebanese Hizbullah protecting and providing services 
to the Shi’a in Lebanon” remains the most important interest in the model. 
The reliability of the results and conclusions in this thesis depend upon the 
quality of the user/subject matter expert data input.  Therefore, the U.S., Israel 
and the West need to invest in fully understanding the interests that drive 
Lebanese Hizbullah and the potential actions it can take to achieve its 
objectives.  The model presented in this thesis (and extensions of it) can be used 
to analyze what Lebanese Hizbullah may do in the coming years.  The 
conclusions from this model can also provide insight to policymakers into what 
can be done to influence Lebanese Hizbullah (and even other stakeholders in 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Note: throughout this thesis, all new terms are introduced in bold and italicized 
text, referring the reader to the Glossary of Terms for its definition.  
A. OBJECTIVES 
The reason that being able to predict those things is important… [is] 
because if you can predict what people will do, you can engineer 
what they will do.  And if you can engineer what they do you can 
change the world, you can get a better result. 
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 2009 
1. Modeling Political Situations 
Models of political stakeholders that capture their interests, priorities, and 
capabilities can help understand key relationships in complex situations such as 
war, terrorism, coercion, and political power shifts.   
Governments, like the U.S., which possess an interest in trying to shape 
an outcome, can leverage decision-analysis models to gain insights about best 
responses involving other stakeholders and in doing so can then shape the 
process in which their behaviors evolve over time.  A thorough assessment of the 
influence, investment, capabilities, and actions of each political stakeholder can 
be used to develop dynamic models that capture the key cause-and-effect 
relations resulting from actions by stakeholders.  The utility of such insights may 
enable decision makers to determine key variables and best courses of action to 
enhance their strategic decision-making capabilities. 
2. Application 
A decision-analysis approach is useful for understanding and ultimately 
influencing the outcome of key Middle Eastern issues, such as terrorism and 
trends of violence.  The U.S. and other Western stakeholders, along with 
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traditional Middle Eastern powers, such as Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, are vying to shape the their own futures, often leveraging their influence 
over smaller nations and political entities that could play pivotal roles in the 
transition of the state space toward, or away from, their respective interests.  
One such pivotal stakeholder that could significantly impact the future stability of 
the Middle East is Lebanese Hizbullah (LH).  The balance of power in the Middle 
East could tip in or out of the favor of the West based on how the region evolves 
in relation to LH’s political situation. 
This thesis develops decision theoretic models rooted in Markov decision 
process (MDP) theory to provide analysis to a Unified Combatant Command 
(UCC) for the following question: 
Will Lebanese Hizbullah decrease its use of internal/external 
violence to attempt to become a larger part of the political process? 
A Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) interface with GeNIe is used to depict and 
analyze the system’s resident stakeholders, interests and actions in a 
dynamic Bayesian network (DBN).  At each stage of this dynamic process, 
each stakeholder is characterized by a state and a set of feasible actions that, 
depending on the actions taken by all stakeholders, determine the transition into 
a new state of the system.  A stakeholder’s transition to a next state may not be 
deterministic, but rather subject to random variations and possible shocks 
(unforeseen events that may have a significant impact on the evolution of the 
system), which we will refer to as ‘shocks to the system’.  
3. Methodology 
We first identify the set of stakeholders, the key concerns of each 
stakeholder, and the feasible actions they can take based on the opinions of 
subject matter experts and open source historical data.  State trees are used to 
capture the order and assigned value of each combination of interests.  These 
hierarchal relationships are then incorporated in the design of influence 
diagrams.  Given the state of the system in each time step, each stakeholder 
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chooses a feasible action.  These actions transition the system to its next state 
based on distributions that result in each stakeholder attaining some reward.  
Future rewards and the successive state of the system only depend on the 
present state of the system, meaning that it is conditionally independent of all 
previous states and actions (this is the Markovian property).  The MDP model 
provides results for the analysis of the interdependencies resulting from 
stakeholder actions and interests.   
B. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis provides an MDP decision theoretic model to capture the 
political dynamics and forecast potential strategies relating to the LH question.    
At each stage of the dynamic process, the primary stakeholder and exogenous 
support are characterized by a state and a set of feasible actions that will, at the 
end of each stage and depending on the actions taken by all stakeholders, 
determine the transition into a new state of the system.  The set of feasible 
actions and the distribution associated with each action are based on the 
precepts of ‘rational play’, which are discussed at length in Chapter II, Section 
C.1. 
Results of this thesis are limited only by constraints on time and the 
capacity of the operating memory of computer software (GeNIe allows for 
building models of any size and complexity). 
C. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis delivers a decision support tool that provides military and 
diplomacy decision makers with insights regarding the potential strategies that 
LH might pursue as it seeks to become a larger part of Lebanon’s political 
process.  The analysis of LH’s interests and potential strategies reveals 
opportunities, otherwise not identified, for affecting aspects of Lebanese 
Hizballah that would result in favorable outcomes for the US and its Middle 
Eastern allies. 
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D. COURSE OF STUDY 
The course of study pursued by the author was to collect, develop, and 
test data, as shown in Figure 1.  The opinions of SMEs from the UCC, were 
instrumental in not only digesting the information gleaned from the literature 
reviewed, but also in the construction of the influence diagrams and overall 
modeling of the LH question. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Course of Study 
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II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Lebanese Hizbullah is an important participant of the Middle Eastern 
political situation that affects peace and prosperity throughout the region.  Within 
Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Middle East, the "followers of Ali" (Shi’a) and the 
"people of the tradition of Muhammad and the community" (Sunni), struggle for 
control of the current and future state of the Middle East.   
Sunni Islam is the largest branch of Islam, comprising at least 85% of the 
world's 1.5 billion Muslims.  Shi’a Muslims account for only one-tenth of the 
Muslim population worldwide (Friedman, 2002).  As Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states vie for economic position and subsequent 
political survival, the Sunni and Shi’a divide is an important component toward 
understanding how allies, interests and actions align.  One of the pioneers of 
political forecasting summarizes the situation that this thesis explores as follows 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2009): 
The basis of Palestinian-Israeli conflict resides, at least for many, in 
economics, not religion.  Religion is a politically useful and easy 
organizing principle that unscrupulous people use to marshal 
support, but it is not what the fight was or is primarily about. The 
fight is about land in a locale where, for most, the economy was 
historically tied to owning property, just as it is in all traditional 
societies.  The economies in the territories… still rely significantly 
on land, but not nearly as much as they did decades ago…. 
Agriculture [now] plays a much altered role… [They] aspire to a 
significant degree to have a modern, service-based economy… 
These are the conditions that are ripe for a self-enforcing incentive 
plan. 
This thesis uses four criteria of data to provide analysis of how LH might 
decrease its use of internal/external violence to attempt to become a larger part 
of the political process.  The first criterion identifies all stakeholders.  The second 
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criterion examines each stakeholder’s set of feasible actions.  The third criterion 
identifies stakeholder interests.  The fourth criterion looks at how a stakeholder 
develops its forecast.  
The following sections of Chapter II provide the historical and cultural 
background requisite to the first criterion, which is to identify the model’s 
stakeholders.  We also examine methodology and past efforts for developing 
political forecasting tools.  In Chapter III, we address the three remaining criteria 
and their application to the data and methodology used in this thesis model. 
B. HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND 
The history of the Middle East and cultural backgrounds help us identify 
and understand the entities that will be necessary to structuring our LH model. 
1. Stakeholder: Lebanese Hizbullah 
The Shi’a political movement that began in Lebanon in the 1970s, known 
as the Lebanese National Movement or Movement of the Deprived, is carried on 
today by LH.  Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, then a 22-year old young revolutionary 
and former Amal representative, gained prominence through his aggressive 
efforts to safeguard territorial integrity in Southern Lebanon (Qasim, 2005).    
Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Hizbullah was organized to fight 
against the Israeli occupation.  Having assumed control of what had been a cabal 
of revolutionaries; Nasrallah led the formation of a coherent resistance 
organization, which was named Hizbullah, meaning literally the “Party of God” as 
interpreted and derived from the Qur’an (Qassem, 2005): 
Your friend can be only Allah, and His messenger and those who 
believe, who establish worship and pay the poor due, and bow 
down [in prayer].  And whosoever taketh Allah and His messenger 
and those who believe for friends [will know that], Lo! The party of 
Allah, they are victorious. 
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Such adherence to Islam and its precepts have resulted in LH’s emergence as a 
revered, supported, and successful resistance movement in Lebanon.  Whereas 
previous Islamic resistance movements like Amal had faltered, LH was able to 
gain support and credibility by characterizing its actions as terrorist strikes 
designed to liberate Israeli occupied lands.  These very well organized strikes, on 
a series of Israeli targets that had previously been impenetrable, quickly 
garnered praise and encouraged the imaginations and hope for what LH could 
yet achieve.  LH had become, and to this day remains, first and foremost, a 
‘resistance organization’.  
Critics of LH’s early success accused both the organization and Nasrallah 
of repeating the mistakes of Amal, that they were premature in assuming 
victories and fame.  Critics scoffed: 
Who authorized Nasrallah to represent all the Lebanese to make 
decisions for them and to embroil them in something they don’t 
want to be embroiled in?  Did Nasrallah appoint himself secretary 
general of all the Lebanese and the whole Arab world? (Norton, 
2007)  
Notwithstanding criticism, LH was able to string together a series of strikes 
in Southern Lebanon whereby in May 2000, Israeli troops withdrew from portions 
of the areas they occupied.  Lebanon had never before been able to perceive 
itself as being able to put Israel on its heals, and yet now, through LH, it had 
done just that for the first time in more than 50 years of struggle along its 
southern border (Qassem, 2005).  As a result, it quickly won the praise of both 
Lebanese nationals and foreign Shi’a Muslims (e.g. Iran) who were sympathetic 
to its charter. 
Though not a state in and of its own right, LH is an extremely influential 
stakeholder when considering Middle Eastern politics and the Islam’s resistance 
of Israel and the West.  LH has grown remarkably since becoming a coherent 
resistance organization in the mid 1980s; no longer merely a resistance 
operation, LH has also become a provider of an extensive network of social 
services and is also a formidable political party within Lebanon.  Advocating the 
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sympathies and support of Shi’a Muslims, LH defines its own self as an Islamic 
organization, whose objectives are to: 1) provide a comprehensive and complete 
program for a better life within the tenants of Islam; 2) employ the full capabilities 
of the Arab world to resist Israeli occupation through militant jihad; and 3) 
establish order whereby Muslims are united under the supreme leadership of the 
Jurist-Theologian (Qassem, 2005).  
LH has further secured the confidence, cooperation and participation of 
Shi’a Muslims by dedicating an enormous amount of its resources toward 
providing social services.  The Lebanese government, corrupt and ineffective, is 
unable to provide these services, which in turn galvanizes LH’s base.  LH has 
employed its social services to provide relief in the wake of regional conflict and 
even natural disaster, relief that has often been characterized by medicinal help, 
meals, reconstruction grants, and interest organizations such as the Islamic 
Health Organization and the Institution for the Wounded, which it provides 
(Qasim, 2005).  
LH’s desire to increase its political legitimacy and influence in both 
Lebanon and throughout the region comes with an indelible price—it too is at a 
crossroads where its commitment to future resistance operations must wane if it 
is to achieve its broader regional objectives.  Disarmament and future 
compromise may be necessary to maximize their payoff—a function of their 
interests as discussed in the Data and Methodology section.  
2. Exogenous Support 
a. Lebanese Diaspora 
There are more Lebanese living abroad than in Lebanon.  
Approximately 15 million of the estimated 19 million Lebanese are spread across 
the globe with more than 3 million in the U.S., roughly equivalent to the 
population of Connecticut.  The majority of the Diaspora’s population is Lebanese 
Christians, outnumbering Lebanese Shi’a and Sunni Muslims by a 3:1 ratio 
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(Nasr, 2007). Notwithstanding religious identity, the Lebanese Diaspora are in 
large part still very allegiant to Lebanon, even echoing Lebanon’s Anti-Western 
sentiment—the global spread and influence of so many Lebanese is problematic 
for Israel and the West.  Language, culture, and identity are important to how 
members of the Lebanese Diaspora stay connected and interested in the affairs 
of the region.  Moreover, the importance of the Diaspora is likely to grow since 
their continued interest and investment in Lebanon has been encouraged by 
legislation that allows all Lebanese living abroad to vote in elections by mail 
beginning in 2013 (Norton, 2007).  Through both the power of purse and vote, 
the Lebanese Diaspora is a stakeholder capable of influencing regional 
development. 
Members of the Diaspora and their businesses provide, both 
voluntarily and through obligation, extensive financial support to LH.  Money is 
routed to Lebanon through forms of business and charities run by Lebanese.  
Business transfers, called “qhums,” are required from those whom have received 
business funding from LH and stipulate that said recipients must give back one-
fifth of their increase to LH for the life of their business (Norton, 2007).  Volunteer 
donations are often funneled through charities.  In Islam, governments do not 
meddle in charities and no accounting is required, and as such, LH is able to 
allocate money as needed or desired–toward hospitals or ammunition. 
b. Lebanese Popular Support 
There are approximately 1 million foreign workers, 400,000 
Palestinian refugees, and 4 million Lebanese living inside Lebanon today.  The 
demographics of the population within Lebanon have been affected by the 
Diaspora.  Although Lebanese Christians outnumber Lebanese Shi’a and Sunni 
Muslims by a 3:1 ratio worldwide, Lebanon has a Muslim majority due to its 
Christian population having the lowest birth rate of all sects within Lebanon and 
the predominately Lebanese Christian emigration (Nasr, 2007). 
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Shi'a Muslims constitute 35% of the population in Lebanon, 
approximately 20% are Sunni Muslims, 20% are Maronite Christians, and the 
remainder is composed of other denominations and religious ethnic groups such 
as Druze (Nasr, 2007).  Political representation is proportional to the population 
of Lebanon’s religious distribution.  Religious communities form coalitions 
through negotiations to identify and elect candidates that favor their shared 
interests.  Such cross-confessional cooperation is by design, and was introduced 
by the Taif accords in 1989 as Lebanon’s first attempt to enable Lebanese 
coalitions to form and serve Lebanese interests, while expelling Syrian influence. 
Although the struggle to strengthen auto-governance continues to this day, 
Lebanon’s 2005 Cedar Revolution achieved significant milestones by causing 
Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon, instituting a government largely 
independent of Syrian interests, and organizing free parliamentary elections. 
Home to LH and a Shi’a majority, Lebanon’s population and 
government are key to modeling the interaction and interests of this study’s 
stakeholders.  The complex nature of its population, the recent assertions and 
political agenda of its government, and both the domestic and global 
consequences of emigration, make Lebanon a primary stakeholder in the 
determination of most Middle Eastern questions. 
c. United States 
The beginning of the United States’ interest in Middle Eastern 
affairs, can be traced to the early to mid-1900s when the establishment of the 
state of Israel and the globalization of crude oil trade changed the region’s power 
and economic structure.  In contrast to the British White Paper of 1939, which 
stipulated an independent Palestine proportionally governed by Palestinian Arabs 
and Jews, Roosevelt’s administration favored a more Jewish friendly plan, one 
that would open “Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization… 
to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish 
commonwealth” (Qassem, 2005).  Truman followed by pressuring the British 
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government to allow more than 200,000 Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine in 
1945-1946, then recognized the “State of Israel” eleven minutes after the 
announcement of the UN declaration ending British mandate in Palestine.  The 
U.S. has since been Israel’s most important ally by granting free trade in 1985, 
providing more than $3 billion in annual aid grants, negotiating billions of dollars 
in loans guarantees through the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group, 
and providing a vast amount of military assistance in terms of technology, 
equipment and training.  These enormous investments and trade favors have 
caused legions of Arabs to suspect an anti-Muslim conspiracy afoot, and that its 
conspirators must be defeated to preserve and honor Islam. 
The U.S. imports 60% of the oil it consumes from other countries.  
Although most of the world’s oil reserves are located in the Middle East, the U.S. 
currently imports more crude oil from Canada than any other nation (Friedman, 
2002).  Imports from Saudi Arabia are second, with Iraq also in the top 10 
countries.  The bulk of proven, remaining oil reserves are located in the Middle 
East, and with more than 727 billion barrels of oil in reserve, the Middle East will 
become an increasingly necessary trade partner for the Unites States’ economic 
survival.  This reality is known both east and west of the Mediterranean, and 
stakeholders on both ends of the sea are posturing to ensure their current and 
future interests are met through the capabilities they develop today on the 
diplomatic, military and economic front. 
d. Iran 
Iran is LH’s most important sponsor.  In Iran, Sunni Muslims are 
outnumbered by Shi’a Muslims by a 1:10 ratio.  Iranian politics are dominated by 
Shi’a influence and the heavy imbalance has quelled all but very few Sunni-Shi’a 
domestic problems.  By sharing the primary denomination of Shi’a Islam, Iran’s 
supreme leader is the same Jurist-Theologian under whom LH promotes the 
unification and order of all Muslims.  LH is, by doctrine, ultimately allegiant to the 
same individual, Ali Hoseyni Khamene’I, Iran’s supreme leader.  Their orthodox 
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roots in Islam mean that Iran and LH share the fundamental beliefs that there be: 
1) an Islamic order under the absolute jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian; 2) an 
Islamic republican system of government, as typified by Iran and promoted by 
LH, which best embodies and supports the fundamentals of Islam; and 3) the 
absolute rejection of superpower hegemony (Nasr, 2007). 
Having a sponsor like Iran is critical to LH’s influence, strength and 
aspirations.  Iran channels its support for LH by providing it with the financing, 
weapons, and training needed to continue its operations.  Such support buys Iran 
influence within LH to have it serve both as a companion and proxy in the 
struggle against Israel and the West.  The symbiotic relationship has thus far 
ensured the survival of LH while extending Iran’s reach westward. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND PAST WORK LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Nature and Application of Decision Games 
In Philip D. Straffin’s Game Theory and Strategy, every decision in a game 
is “the logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation” (Straffin, 1996).  
While conflicts in the Middle East, and more specifically the UCC’s question 
certainly involve both elements of stakeholder conflict and cooperation, we will 
examine how our proposed model measures to Straffin’s definition of a game.  
He defines the basic nature of such games to be (Straffin, 1996): 
1. There are at least two players.  A player may be an individual, 
but it may also be a more general entity like a company, a nation, 
or even a biological species. 
2. Each player has a number of possible strategies, courses of 
action which he or she may choose to follow. 
3. The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of 
the game. 
4. Associated to each possible outcome of the game is a collection 
of numerical payoffs, one to each player.  These payoffs represent 
the value of the outcome to the different players. 
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Rational play is fundamental to understanding how stakeholders reason 
before taking action.  This is called Rational Choice Theory (RCT).   
Straffin applies the aforementioned principles of game theory to the 
anthropological thought known as functionalism.  He writes that functionalism 
shapes the decisions a player makes as the “customs, institutions or behavior 
patterns in a society can be interpreted as functional responses to problems 
which the society faces.”  Such perspective in the Middle East could provide 
valuable insight regarding the organization of societies and how they collectively 
organize and respond in a variety of situations.  
2. The Essence of Decision Making 
We will now examine Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis to understand established decision theoretic 
nomenclature as it applies to political decision making and gain a historical 
context of how decision theory has been applied to other major international 
crises.  Allison suggests three broad implications in applying decision theory to 
political decision making: 1) techniques developed to enhance political decision 
making can be applied broadly beyond foreign affairs; 2) due to the complex 
nature of human systems and endless amounts of relevant data, simplification is 
essential; and 3) predictions come with zero guarantee; however, they do always 
provide important insight, inferences and perspective that might not otherwise be 
realized (Allison, 1971). 
In his review of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison first considered three 
fundamental facts, as they pertained to the Soviet Union: 1) the USSR was 
equipped with only 20 ICBMs in 1962; 2) the mere 6 nuclear submarines in the 
Soviet Fleet would have to travel 7,000 miles from the nearest strategic nuclear 
submarine base to U.S. shores; and 3) the best hope of threatening U.S. 
homeland was with fleet of 200 long range bombers (Allison, 1999).  These facts 
implied that the Soviet Union was limited to practically a binary nuclear option: 
turn from the U.S. blockade and avoid nuclear confrontation, else, ignore the 
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blockade and pursue the nuclear option. President Kennedy himself realized the 
razor’s edge on which the soviets stood.  He told congressional leaders on 
October 22 that, if the Soviet ships did not stop, the U.S. would be forced to fire 
the first shot, inviting retaliation and would lead to “war in the next 24 hours” 
(Allison, 1999). 
The former Soviet Union is a good lens through which Allison investigates 
how the interests of rational stakeholders interact with decisions and state space.  
The following questions were cultivated though the analysis of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, but are applicable and relevant to any situation we could heretofore 
consider (Allison, 1999):  
Where do organizations derive their preferences? 
Why does organizational behavior constrain “rationality”?   
Why are organizational structures sometimes so particular?   
How do organizations relate to their environment? 
The final question is especially interesting in how it relates to the issues 
this thesis considers when modeling Middle Eastern stakeholders.  As we 
consider the political, economic, and historical environment of the Middle East, 
these following conditions shape how we model: 1) our stakeholders and their 
salience; 2) what factors, such as parochial priorities and goals that shape each 
stakeholder’s interests and the value associated with said interests; 3) the weight 
of each stakeholder on the transition of the system to the next state; and 4) how 
the interests and decisions of stakeholder’s combine to influence their own and 
other stakeholders decisions and actions. 
Allison provides Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait as an example of a rational 
stakeholder (Iraq) seeking to maximize its payoff through a strategic gamble that 
was ultimately met and defeated with surprising opposition (Allison, 1999):  
Saddam Hussein would never have resorted to such a desperate 
measure … if Iraq’s economic condition had not been so dire… By 
adding Kuwait’s fabulous wealth to the depleted Iraqi treasury, 
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Saddam hoped to slash Iraq’s foreign debt and launch the 
ambitious reconstruction programmes he had promised to his 
people in the wake of the war with Iran. 
Saddam’s miscalculation of how the U.S. and United Nations would respond to 
his invasion of Kuwait was not due to a lack of rationality, but rather due failing to 
forecast how Iraq’s behavior would interact with the interests and decisions of 
other stakeholders. 
3. The Logic of Self Interest 
The literature reviewed in the previous subsection exemplifies the robust 
cannon, which historians and mathematicians have penned in thinking about and 
modeling events that have already happened in the world.  To shift from merely 
projecting the past onto the present, and in order to begin modeling the present 
to develop and analyze forecasts of the future, we will now review Predictioneer’s 
Game, by Bueno de Mesquita.  Although his models are proprietary, Bueno de 
Mesquita suggests that the application of the principles decision theory can help 
us look at political decision making in a much more rigorous and scientific way 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2009).  As we endeavor to do so, we must seek to 
thoroughly understand all criteria, interactions, and causality in the models we 
seek to develop. 
Bueno de Mesquita postulates that politics are predictable.  He claims that 
he has applied decision theory to very basic information that meets the 
assumptions of RCT, to produce forecasts with a purported 90% accuracy rate.  
He further writes that “the key to good prediction is getting the logic right, or 
‘righter’ than any way that is achieved by other means of prediction.”  Bueno de 
Mesquita suggests that we don’t need very much to predict well, in fact, we need 
to only know the following: 1) who has a stake in trying to shape the outcome of a 
decision (stakeholders); 2) what they want (interests); 3) how focused they are 
on the problem at hand (utility); and 4) how much clout they bring to bear (Bueno 
de Mesquita, 2009).  These factors are quantifiable in the LH situation studied in 
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this thesis, and as such, according to Beuno de Mesquita, we can anticipate 
reasonable forecasts from the models developed to answer the question posed 
by the UCC.  
According to Bueno de Mesquita, there is no history in forecasting or 
shaping the future.  The dead reckoning of each stakeholder, meaning knowing 
where and how they are, enables us to reliably forecast how they and the system 
will transition.  In his own words, ”how they got there turns out not to be terribly 
critical in predicting” (Bueno de Mesquita, 2009). 
Other ideas discussed by Bueno de Mesquita, which shape how we 
formulate this thesis model, are as follows: 
1) Metaperception.  While it is critical to think about what other 
stakeholders think about their interests, it is just as important to 
think about what other people think about what you think about 
your own interests.  This is akin to our assumption of perfect 
knowledge in the model. 
2) Language.  Ordinary everyday language can be vague and 
ambiguous.  The dynamics and complexity associated with 
political forecasting necessitate robust explanations and 
articulate definitions for each attribute and parameter of the 
model. 
3) Design.  In accordance with Nash equilibrium, each 
stakeholder’s interaction within the state space must designed 
such that they do not have any incentive to take an action that is 
not included in their strategy (set of feasible actions). 
4) Sensitivity Analysis.  Because “as you know… men are likely to 
forget in the heat of action where their best interests lie and let 
their emotions carry them away.”   
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5) Shocks.  Thorough analysis should allow for and examine the 
effects of exogenous shocks that are products of outside, 
unexamined forces.  Such shocks can wreak havoc on a 
system.   
4. A Systems Analysis Approach 
We next review the paper entitled Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist 
Threats: A Systems Analysis Approach to Setting Priorities Among 
Countermeasures (Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002).  Herein the authors 
propose a game theoretic systems analysis approach to modeling political 
decision making.  They apply their systems approach to the specific question of 
modeling potential terrorist attacks and U.S. response scenarios.   
The authors order information and manipulate data by first ranking the key 
interests and states, and then by using a convenient visual and analytical 
decision support tool: decision trees.  Their decision trees consolidate and 
organize the volumes of information needed to identify the model’s stakeholders, 
states, and interests.  An important assumption, necessary to the design of any 
decision-analysis model, is that all stakeholders are in fact rational actors with a 
set of interests that can be ranked to determine the probability distribution of 
feasible actions.  The resulting decision trees for each stakeholder are then used 
to develop a representation of the interdependencies among stakeholders in an 
influence diagram.  Such an influence diagram, they suggest, would allow the 
consequences of different attack and response scenarios to be assessed.  The 
influence diagram shown in Figure 2 is a representation of the overarching model 




Figure 2.   Influence Diagram (From Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 2002)  
The influence diagram in Table 2 captures the benefits of such an 
overarching systems analysis approach in conveying the known and assumed 
information as it applies to the system.  Further information regarding 
methodology and utility of influence diagrams will be discussed later in more 
detail.  
Whereas the aforementioned paper models the system in only one time 
period, this thesis uses similar techniques to not only identify stakeholders, rank 
states and interests, and model interdependencies, but it also charts new ground 
by using dynamic functions to show the results of a multi-time period system.  
The ability to model the state of a system and decisions taken, followed by 
subsequent consequences and the system’s transition to the next set of 
decisions, consequences, and so on, adds realism to the forecasts and analysis 
that these models provide.  The authors identify the need for, and this thesis 
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endeavors to prove, dynamic modeling as the means to iteratively evolve the 
stakeholders and state space in order to develop reliable political forecasts. 
5. Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering models, such as those developed by Boeing to aid 
the UCC in their analysis of LH, are limited in terms of their useful application.  
These models are designed to represent the system that influences and is 
influenced by LH.  Although these system engineering models paint a very clear 
picture of system interactions, they are deterministic and involve 
difference/differential equation models.  The model shown in Figure 3 portrays 
what Boeing describes as the ‘characteristics of [LH]’ that drive the actions and 
behaviors of the system.  In terms of this thesis, the Boeing model is meant to 
depict how relationships with other stakeholders drive the interaction of LH 
interests with state, financial, militia, and religious entities to shape LH’s 
‘capability’, ‘capacity’ and ‘legitimacy’ in a single time period.  This modeling 
approach fails to incorporate dynamic processes, stakeholder transition, and 
random variations (shocks) to the system.  Subject matter experts (SME) 
workshops quickly identified that the systems engineering models fell well short 











III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA 
1. Introduction to Feasible Actions 
Feasible actions are manifested by the application of a stakeholder’s 
resources that (may) influence the state of one or more stakeholders.  
Consequentially, a stakeholder’s set of feasible actions may depend on the state 
of the system.  In this thesis, actions are categorized according to Diplomacy, 
Information, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement. 
In order to simplify the design of the model, we merge the set of 
categories from seven to just three: 1) Diplomacy, Economic and Financial 
actions; 2) Information and Intelligence actions; and finally, 3) Military and Law 
Enforcement actions.  Diplomacy, Economic and Financial actions shape 
negotiations between two stakeholders, which frame a range for future economic 
or financial actions.  Information and Intelligence is the term used to describe the 
use of propaganda, doctrine and intelligence gathering capabilities.  Military and 
Law Enforcement actions are any demonstration or application of violence, either 
internal or external, to achieve a stakeholder’s interests. 
2. Lebanese Hizbullah Actions 
We have identified eight feasible actions whereby the interests of LH are 
tenable. The first two fall within the scope of Diplomacy, Economic and Financial 
Actions.  LH would be able to further develop the social services it provides to the 
Shi’a, strengthen its militia, and expand its influence throughout Lebanon by 1) 
developing an even closer relationship with Iran; or 2) Increase political 
maneuvering within Lebanon.  Both of these diplomatic options more or less 
continue trends that have already been manifested.  LH could conceivably 
strengthen its legitimacy as a political party by continuing to pursue actions that  
prove successful to these ends. 
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The SMEs helped us to identify how LH could choose to leverage 
information and intelligence operations to further its interests.  Such operations 
would include 1) increasing the organizations outreach to the Lebanese 
Diaspora; and 2) expanding goods and social services beyond just the Shi’a 
populace.  While outreach to the Diaspora could yield huge financial dividends, 
befriending non-Shi’a Muslims, Christians and Lebanese of other denominations 
could result in LH gaining a majority in Parliament to ultimately attain what has 
seemed unattainable—political control of Lebanon. 
Finally, there are four Military and Law Enforcement actions available to 
LH.  Through their militia, they may choose to 1) provoke or attack Israel; 2) 
increase illicit actions; 3) sponsor or conduct a terrorist attack; or 4) increase 
support to Hamas.  Our SMEs believe that presently, actions 1 and 3 seem 
unlikely, while actions 2 and 4 are likely preferred ways of continuing their 
resistance to Israel and the West, albeit through less formal, or even surrogate, 
channels.  
3. Lebanese Hizbullah Interests 
In the context of this thesis, LH’s interests have been defined by the 
author and SMEs as being to: 1) protect and provide services to the Shi’a 
throughout Lebanon; 2) possess and maintain a militia capability; 3) resist Israel; 
4) defend Lebanon; and 5) control Lebanon. 
Protecting and providing services to the Shi’a was once an ancillary 
mission for LH, but it is now its single most important, recognized and supported 
operation.  It has gained legitimacy by providing the basic services that the 
Lebanese government could not (Norton, 2007).  LH’s network of social services 
provides not only vast popular support and seats within Lebanon’s current 
Parliament, but it as well provides future possibilities for increased support, 
influence and political position. 
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Possessing a militia was a right granted to LH after Lebanon’s 15-year 
civil war that ended in 1990.  While all other militias were ordered to disarm, LH 
was allowed to keep its weapons and maintain militia operations for the purpose 
of providing “national resistance” against the Israeli occupation of southern 
Lebanon.  LH maintains its militia capability to this day for that same purpose, 
namely to oppose Lebanese territories still possessed by Israel (i.e., Shebaa 
Farms).  Opposition to Israeli occupation through militant jihad is the fundamental 
purpose for which LH possesses and maintains a militia. 
LH has stated that its categorical opposition to all attempts to justify the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine is based on the fact that “changes 
that have been brought about by history are facts of the past, and every nation in 
this world has a history that is different from its present” (Qassem, 2005).  LH 
resists Israel to not only reclaim territories under Israeli occupation, but also to 
restore Islam to prominence by first plucking from its side the Israeli menace – if 
it were not able to do so, the question for all Muslims and associated 
organizations would be “How could a tiny Jewish state amass so much military 
and economic power if the Islamic way of life—not Christianity or Judaism—is 
God’s most ideal religious path?” (Friedman, 2002) 
LH is perceived as defending Lebanon by resisting Israel.  Doing so 
legitimizes the right it has been given by Lebanon’s government to maintain a 
militia, which at the same time provides it with a force that no other political party 
in Lebanon has, all but assuring its survival even by force.    
The final key interest of LH, is to gain ultimate control of Lebanese politics 
and Lebanon’s national agenda.  Although this power grab is not likely to occur 
by election in the near future given Lebanon’s confessional distribution of 
parliamentary seats, there is the possibility that LH could one day rise to national 
prominence.  Control of Lebanon might one day be LH’s if it is able to continue its 




There are three steps in developing the MDP LH model.  First, we develop 
state trees to capture the interests and feasible actions of stakeholders.  We then 
merge the state trees to form a single influence diagram that captures the 
interaction of stakeholders and exogenous support.  Finally, we implement the 
influence diagram in a software package. 
1. State Trees 
State trees are similar to decision trees.  Decision trees are typically 
horizontal depictions of a set of actions or decisions and their possible 
consequences.  We now show how these probabilistic dependencies are 
represented by decision trees, and then by state trees, by using a basic scenario 
known as ‘The Party Problem’ (Abbas, 2004).  The Party Problem was 
introduced by Ronald A. Howard at Stanford University.  In the Party Problem, 
our stakeholder, in this case a father, wishes to plan a birthday party for his 
daughter to take place during the coming weekend, which can be held indoors or 
outdoors.  He is not sure if it will be sunny or raining on the day of the party.  His 
daughter’s happiness, or rather how much she values the party, therefore 









The father has access to a weather forecast.  From historical data, he knows 
that:  
( | ) 0.75











We see that the probability of correctly forecasting rain is greater than the 
probability of incorrectly forecasting rain.  The father’s information and possible 
consequences for his decision are depicted in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   Basic Decision Tree: “The Party Problem” 
The values at the reward nodes (diamond) are computed using Bayes’ 
Theorem, which states: 
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We, therefore, have the following: 
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Now assessing the situation according to his daughter’s happiness, the 
father calculates the maximum expected value of each of his decisions by: 
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( | )* ( , )
(0.863)(100) (0.137)( 50) 79.4
)




E Outdoors forecastSunny P Sunny forecastSunny Value Sunny Outdoors
P RaiE Outdoors forecastSunny
E Outdoors forecast







= + − =
| ) ( | )* ( , )









doors forecastSunny P Sunny forecastSunny Value Sunny Indoors







= − + = −
) ( | )* ( , )







ecastRain P Sunny forecastSunny Value Sunny Outdoors








= + − = −
) ( | )* ( , )
( | )* ( , )
(0.271)( 20) (0.729)(20) 9.
( | )
( | ) 16
P Sunny forecastRain Value Sunny Indoors
P Rains forecaE Indoors forecastRain
E Indoors forecastRa




= − + =
 
 27
Thus, the father maximizes the value of the party by making the optimal decision 
to hold the party outdoors if the forecast calls for sunny skies.  If the forecast 
calls for rain, the father maximizes the value of the party by making the optimal 
decision to hold the party indoors.  
State trees are similar in that they depict the set of stakeholder interests 
and the associated utility values of all feasible combinations of interests.  They 
are sometimes called expected utility models, since their theoretical framework 
assumes that a stakeholder strives to obtain the largest utility or net gain given 
their current state in the system.  Although a state tree cannot and does not 
contain the information that decision trees contain, they are often times a good 
first step in modeling complex networks since they are easier to generate and 
more explicit in terms of the relationships, hierarchy and values they model.     
A state tree can capture the basic elements of the Party Problem.  We first 
consider the stakeholder, who in this case is both the father and his daughter.  
Next, we identify their primary interests, which are: (1) party location, and (2) 
weather.  This state tree and its hierarchal structure is shown in Figure 5.  
Weather forecast is a key component in the aforementioned decision tree, but it 
is not present in the state tree as it is not an interest.  Since the weather’s 
forecast is critical information that the father considers, we make special note of 
this and any other key relationships that might directly or indirectly affect his 
decision making.  Such noted dependencies enable us to transition from a basic 
state tree to a larger influence diagram in order to capture the full complexity of 
the Party Problem. 
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Figure 5.   Basic State Tree: “The Party Problem” 
Whereas in Figure 4, utilities are functions of decision and chance, utility 
calculations are not performed with state trees as shown in Figure 5.  Rather, the 
utilities of each combination of stakeholder interests, called the state space, are 
explicitly assigned.  In Figure 5, interesting dynamics of how the daughter’s 














This shows that having the party indoors notwithstanding sunny skies is valued 
more than having the party outdoors with rain.  
The Party Problem illustrates the concepts that we now apply in modeling 
the LH question.  The interests of LH were identified through a series of meetings 
and other formal correspondence with anthropologists, economists, intelligence 
analysts and various other SMEs made available by the UCC for the 
development of this study.  The identified interests can be economic, diplomatic, 
political, social or even religious in nature.  
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The state tree in Figure 6 models the interests of the primary stakeholder 
for this thesis (LH).  The information contained therein is the combination of the 
expressed belief of the UCC’s SMEs and the interpretation by this author of the 
historical literature reviewed.  Five key interests are identified for LH, and while 
they are not listed in any sort of hierarchal or priority order, the most fundamental 
interests tended to percolate to the top of the tree each time we attempted to 
frame the sequence of possible interest combinations.  A value, ranging from 0 to 
100, is assigned for each combination of interest(s), essentially meaning that ‘if 
LH had 100 dollars to spend, the number shown is how much they would pay to 
live in a world wherein such combinations were and/or were not realized.’  The 
interests of LH are defined and discussed in the previous Data section and can 
be found in the Glossary of Terms.  
 
Figure 6.   LH State Tree 
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2. Influence Diagrams 
Influence Diagrams (ID) are a relatively new method for representing 
probabilistic dependencies in decision analysis (Howard and Matheson, 2005).  
The ID is an alternative to the use of decision trees and state trees for depicting 
decision or interest situations.  It is “at once both a formal description of the 
problem that can be treated by computers and a representation easily 
understood by people in all walks of life and degrees of technical proficiency.  It 
forms a bridge between qualitative description and quantitative specification” 
(Howard and Matheson, 2005).  Figure 7 depicts how various elements of a 
decision situation are represented in IDs:   
 
(a)                                          (c)                                         (e) 
 
(b)                                          (d)                                         (f) 
Figure 7.   ID definitions 
Chance variables are represented by circles, decisions by square/rectangles, 
and interests by diamonds.  Figure 7a shows that the probabilities associated 
with “B depends on the outcome of A”.  Figure 7b depicts how the probabilities 
associated with “D depends on decision C”.  In Figure 7c, the decision at F is 
made with the knowledge of the outcome at E.  In Figure 7d, the decision at H is 
made knowing what decision at G was made.  Finally, the dotted arc in Figure 7e 
depicts a temporal relationship the chance variable I influences the next time 
step’s decision made at J.  An example of an interest, the calculation of a value 
or utility, is shown at K in Figure 7f.  The terms defined by the graphical 
representations of chance, decision, and interest are called nodes.  
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Decision, interest, and chance nodes are connected to model a Bayesian 
network that can solve for expected utilities given mapped interactions.  An 
influence diagram that models the aforementioned “Party Problem” is shown in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Basic Influence Diagram: “The Party Problem” 
The forecast probabilistically depends on the weather.  The father’s 
decision as to where the party will be held, is made after receiving the forecast.  
The resulting measure of his daughter’s happiness, as calculated in the decision 
tree and similarly captured in Figure 8, is a value that depends on the party’s 
location and actual weather.  
3. The LH Influence Diagram 
LH is the main stakeholder and sole decision maker.  Secondary 
participants are the Lebanese Diaspora, and Lebanese people.  The influence 
diagram shown in Figure 9 contains three decision nodes (rectangles), four 
chance nodes (circles), and an interest (or value) node (diamond).  
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Figure 9.   Complete Influence Diagram  
Each decision node contains a set of actions related to the rectangle’s 
classifier.  The three decision nodes contain the following feasible LH actions, as 
identified by the UCC’s SMEs: 
Diplomacy/Econ/Finance: Develop closer relationship with Iran 
 Increase political maneuvering 
Information/Intelligence: Increase outreach to Diaspora 
 Expand goods/services beyond Shi’a 
Military/Law Enforcement: Provoke or attack Israel 
  Increase illicit actions 
  Sponsor or conduct a terrorist attack 
  Increase support to Hamas 
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The top-most decision node, Diplomacy/Econ/Finance, represents ‘soft’ 
decisions that may be made with knowledge about popular support for LH within 
Lebanon, Lebanese people in the Diaspora, and past Syrian actions. The second 
decision node, Information/Intelligence, focuses on decisions related to LH’s 
intelligence apparatus; once more, this kind of decision is taken with some noisy 
information about Syria’s past actions and knowledge regarding popular support 
for LH within Lebanon. The last decision node, Military/Law Enforcement, deals 
with military acts inside and outside Lebanon.  LH makes these decisions with 
some information about popular support for LH within Lebanon and with some 
information about the previous military action’s outcome.   
The chance node “LB PopSpt” concerns the Lebanese popular opinion 
vis-à-vis LH’s decision situation. The popular opinion in Lebanon may be 
probabilistically dependant on LH’s decisions (arrows going from the rectangles 
to the circle), and on the result of military actions (if any).  The influence of the 
Lebanese Diaspora on popular opinion within Lebanon may be probabilistically 
dependant on LH’s diplomatic actions. Also, any military outcome may shape 
subsequent political and economic support provided by the Lebanese Diaspora 
to the Lebanese populace.  
The last important element is the value node, which depends on the result 
of popular support within Lebanon for LH, and the Diaspora’s support for LH. The 
value to LH corresponding to each possible outcome is derived from past 
discussions during our meetings with the UCC.  
The abridged influence diagram, shown in Figure 10, is easier to 
implement and still captures the key aspects of the decision situation. The main 
difference in relation to the complete version is that the decisions have been 
collapsed into one big decision node. We still can input arbitrary combinations of 




Figure 10.   Abridged Influence Diagram 
While much work was done by the author, advisors, and SMEs, to lay the 
groundwork for a dynamic model that captures the interests, decisions and 
interactions of two stakeholders and their exogenous support, in a single state 
space, no formal modeling or analysis is done in this thesis for a scenario 
involving multiple stakeholders.  These multi-player game model diagrams would 
result from questions such as: How will Syria’s potential/likely decisions and 
actions affect their relationship with LH?  The IDs shown in Figures 11 and 12 
were developed to answer the LH and Syria question, using the same 
methodology, meticulous detail, dialog and SME review as the LH diagram:  
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Figure 11.   Complete LH and Syria Influence Diagram 
  
Figure 12.   Abridged LH and Syria Influence Diagram 
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The models shown in Figures 11 and 12 assume that each stakeholder 
has interests and a reward he is trying to maximize through taking a sequence of 
actions determined by his forecast of the other stakeholder, as well as the 
contemporary actions of relevant exogenous support and the previous slice’s 
actions of the other stakeholder.  Research and an eventual model to this end 
would prove useful in modeling many types of stakeholder interdependencies, 
and could as well lay the foundation for increasing the number of ‘participants in 
the game’ to well beyond two stakeholders—a point at which exogenous support 
is modeled fully with their own interests, actions and rewards, rather than 
probabilistic chance nodes. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. GeNIe Implementation 
The influence diagram is implemented in GeNIe by explicitly creating 
chance nodes for every LH interest.  These interest nodes map to a single 
reward node.  The dimension of time is created by mapping previous chance 
nodes to future iterations of the same influence diagram, which effectually makes 
each successive network dependent on the previous network.  Figure 13 depicts 
a single layer of the full influence diagram, and contains only those nodes with 
temporal relationships, making the full implementation a DBN.   
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Figure 13.   Temporal relationships in the GeNIe implementation 
As seen in Figure 13, each period of time (or iteration) of the influence 
diagram is called a slice.  Each slice represents one time period, which for all 
intents and purposes of this study is approximated as being equal to one year.   
The full implementation of the LH model is shown in Figure 14, where five 
independent interest (chance) nodes are added to the network, which is how the 
complexity of 25+5+5=215 interest combinations is added. 
 38
 
Figure 14.   Full GeNIe implementation 
Each slice contains eight chance nodes, but are interest nodes for a total 
of 15 interest chance nodes mapping into a single reward node in the full 
influence diagram.  For the purpose of scalability, these chance nodes are 
binary, and thus we have 215 possible interest combinations.  In GeNIe, users are 
required to assign values to each interest combination.  With 32,768 possible 
interest combinations, it is necessary for us to simplify the task of computing 
these values.  A software tool, scripted by the author in VBA and named DMAPS: 
A Dynamic Model for the Analysis of Political Stakeholders, does this for us by 
summing the user-assigned values for each interest across the set of all possible 
interest combinations.   
 39
DMAPS prompts the user to assign a value to the realization or absence 
of each interest.  These values are then automatically varied to provide the user 
with a total of 11 possible value combinations (called scenarios) from which they 
can elect to evaluate their model as shown in Figure 15.  Multiple scenarios allow 
the user to gain insight through sensitivity analysis. 
  
Figure 15.   DMAPS user prompt for the assignment of interest values 
Notice that each interest is associated with the model’s ‘three slices’ which 
are representative of the discrete time period (three years) for which this thesis 
investigates.  The user can choose to evolve the worth of interests for LH by 
assigning increasing or decreasing values for each interest according to their 
associated slice.  This evolution of interests captures the fact that, say, if LH 
intends to become a more legitimate political entity, through the progression of 
each slice of the model, it must maintain its focus and value of protecting and 
providing services to the Shi’a, increase the value associated with controlling 
Lebanon, and decrease the importance it associates with resisting Israel outright.  
Using DMAPS not only benefits the user by assisting with the assignment 
of values for every combination of interests, but it also ensures the user 




been designed to provide useful tools for the user such as prompts, help icons, 
and auto-population formulae that reduce the time and error associated with user 
interface. 
2. Required Data 
Data relating to the interests, actions, values and distributions were 
obtained through discussions with the UCC’s SMEs.  
After having determined the scope of the LH question, which identified the 
critical components for our ID (namely the stakeholders, exogenous support, 
interests and actions), data was collected and reviewed in order to assign both 
realistic and notional values to the model’s 361 variable fields (see Table 1).  The 
somewhat tedious process is reduced through the use of DMAPS which 
automatically calculates the compliment of every initial distribution provided by 
the user, reducing data entry from 361 fields to just 197.  The logic used to 
identify these 361 fields is discussed in Chapter III, Section C.2.b.  The efficiency 
of using the DMAPS interface is shown in Table 1. 
Variable Fields. Fields with DMAPS 
Values assigned to LH’s interests (all) 30 30 
Distribution of LH’s interests (all) 40 20 
Distribution of Diasp Spt (all) 48 24 
Distribution of LB Pop Spt (t=0) 48 24 
Distribution of LB Pop Spt (t=1,2) 192 96 
Distribution of Military Action (all) 3 3 
Total 361 197 
Table 1.   Efficiencies of DMAPS pertaining to user interface  
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The values and distributions assigned to the fields shown in Table 1 were 
determined through an iterative process shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Data Development 
a. Values 
Table 2 contains the values assigned to each LH interest across 
the model’s three slices.  An interest can be assigned a different, or evolving, 
value to capture the fact that LH might value said interest more or less in the 
future based on its desires to become a larger part of the Lebanese political 
process.  We use, from Table 2, the example of the interest ‘Militia Capability’.  
We see that the ‘current’ value, or t=0, which LH associates with possessing a 
militia capability is ± 90 (on a scale 0 to 100).  The value of this interest 
decreases to ± 70 in t=2, and again to ± 50 in t=3, representative of the SME 
analysis that as LH seeks to become a larger part of the Lebanese political 
process, its emphasis on maintaining and employing a militia must be reduced. 
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Table 2.   Values assigned to LH interests 
b. Distributions 
From the GeNIe implementation, we can visually deduce the 
number of distributions contained within our model.  In each slice, we see that 
there is one decision node, two exogenous actor chance nodes, 2 LH military 
action chance nodes, and 5 LH interest chance nodes.  The number of 
distributions contained within each of these chance nodes is determined by the 
permutation of its own distributed outcomes and the outcomes of its antecedent 
chance and/or decision nodes.  From Figure 13, we see that the number of 
distributions, contained in each chance node, are summarized in Table 3. 
 43
Chance Node Antecedents Number of Distributions 
LH Interests (all) Diasp Spt 
LB Pop Spt 
(2 Diasp Spt)(2 LB Pop Spt)* 
(5 LH Interests) = 20 
Diasp Spt (all) Actions 
Mil Action 
(3 Mil Action)(8Actions) = 24 
LB Pop Spt (t-0) Actions 
Mil Action 
(3 Mil Action)(8 Actions) = 24 
LB Pop Spt (t-1,2) Actions 
Mil Action 
(3 Mil Action)(8 Actions)* 
(2 Diasp Spt)(2 LB Pop Spt) = 96 
Mil Action (all) None 3 
Table 3.   Efficiencies of DMAPS pertaining to user interface 
The 361 user populated fields discussed in Chapter III, Section C.2 
is the sum of the product of each LH interest chance node having a binomial 
outcome, 3 potential outcomes in the Military Action chance node, and 30 values 
explicitly assigned to each LH interest. 
 
(20 24 24 96)(2) 3 20 361+ + + + + =  
The distributions assigned at each chance node in this model are 
based on data provided by the UCC’s SMEs.  Due to the number and length of 
said distributions, readers may request access to the author’s version of DMAPS 
for information on the values assigned to each of the model’s distributions. 
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As we model how LH might decrease its use of internal/external violence 
in an attempt to become a larger part of the political process, our ID calculates 
the expected reward associated with each feasible outcome to the system for 
each scenario run.  In order to scale the results and conduct reasonable analysis, 
we take the average reward per scenario to determine their deviation from their 
respective base case scenario.  Each non-base case scenario is generated by 
DMAPS after the user has entered his user-specified values for each LH interest.  
Then, for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, DMAPS iteratively varies the values 
of each LH interest first by a multiple of ± 1/2 (a), then by a multiple of ± 3/2 (b).  
These generated scenarios, in addition to the user-specified scenario, provide us 
with results useful to sensitivity analysis.   
1. Scenario 1 
First, we will investigate a base case scenario (Scenario 1) where the 
values of each interest are based on data provided by the UCC’s SMEs.  DMAPS 
generates ten subsequent scenarios based on Scenario 1.  Tables 4 and 5 
contain the values for the interests of Scenarios 1. 
 




Table 5.   User-specified Scenario 1 (base case for Scenarios 1) 
Each of these value distributions generate a single array (1 x 32,768) containing 
the sum of all possible combinations of interests.  GeNIe then solves the network 
based on the user specified interest combination values and distributions at each 
chance node.   
The values in Scenario 1 provide us with a base case that is 
representative of the most realistic forecast of future LH actions, given our 
assumption of accuracy of the SME data.  As we are interested in knowing the 
LH’s optimal strategy (what actions LH might take during each slice, or time 
step), we refer to the values calculated by GeNIe at the decision nodes for each 
action.   
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Table 6.   Scenario 1 optimizing action at t=0: Provoke or attack Israel 
  
Table 7.   Scenario 1 optimizing action at t=1: Increase illicit activities 
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Table 8.   Scenario 1 optimizing action at t=2 
  
Table 9.   Scenario 1 reward node 
The optimal strategy, or action, calculated by GeNIe suggests that in the 
first slice, LH would maximize its expected reward by “provoking or attacking 
Israel.”  In the second slice, no matter how the state space transitioned after the 
first slice, LH would invariably maximize its expected reward by “increasing illicit 
activities.”  It is not until the third slice that we see (truncated in Table 8) that LH 
would maximize its reward by taking an action conditional on the state space 
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after the first and second slices.  There are just two optimizing actions at t=2.  Its 
optimal strategy, given the state of the system at t=2 would be to either “increase 
outreach to the Diaspora” or “develop a closer relationship with Iran.”   
The reward node calculates the set of all optimal strategies, and shows 
(truncated in Table 9) that LH’s optimizing action after t=2, would have been to 
“develop a closer relationship with Iran.”  Closer investigation of the reward node 
reveals that there are 128 feasible combinations of actions in slice 2 that LH 
could take following the resultant combination of LB Popular Support and 
Diaspora Support from t=0,1.  These 128 feasible combinations are grouped into 
16 sets based on the binary nature of LB Popular Support and Diaspora support 
for each slice: 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
(2 )(2 )(2 )(2 ) 16
(2 )(2 )(2 )(2 )(8 ) 128
DiaspSpt DiaspSpt LBPopSpt LBPopSpt sets
DiaspSpt DiaspSpt LBPopSpt LBPopSpt Actions feasible combinations
=
=  
For each of the 16 sets, the maximum value of the set is the optimizing action 
that LH should take in t=2.  For example, in a state where the Lebanese Diaspora 
was supporting LH in t=0, Lebanese Popular Opinion is supporting LH in t=0, but 
Lebanese Diaspora is not supporting LH in t=1, and Lebanese Popular Opinion is 
also not supporting LH in t=1, then the optimal strategy or action for LH to take 
would be to “develop a closer relationship with Iran” with a reward value of 419.  
Table 10 orders actions according to their forecasted reward, given the 
aforementioned state space. 
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Reward Action 
419 Develop closer relationship with Iran 
416 Increase outreach to Diaspora 
401 Increase political maneuvering 
396 Provoke or attack Israel 
388 Expand goods and services beyond Shia 
376 Increase illicit activities 
368 Sponsor or conduct a terrorist attack 
365 Increase support to Hamas 
Table 10.   Ordered rewards for the given state space. 
Due to the number of sets (16) and the number of values calculated for 
actions within each set (128), readers may contact the author to request a copy 
of DMAPS to view the full summary of the optimal strategies.   
Every generated variant of Scenario 1, with the exception of Scenario 
1.1a, share the same optimal strategy.  Maximizing LH’s reward after t=2 clearly 
has negative connotations for improved relations with Israel and the West as 
seen in the summary of optimal strategies: 
 Scenario 1: Optimal LH Strategy 
 t=0: Provoke or attack Israel 
 t=1: Increase illicit activities 
 t=2: Develop closer relationship with Iran  
Varying the interest’s values changed the optimal strategy exclusively in 1.1, 
where the optimal strategy for 15 of its 16 possible states after t=2 is to “increase 
outreach to the Diaspora”–the one exception being “develop closer relationship 
with Iran.”  These results provide a strong forecast that (per the values, 
distributions and design of the model) LH is likely to maximize its reward by 
pursuing strategies unfavorable to Israel and the West in their quest to become a 
larger part of the Lebanese political process. 
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B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis helps us determine what interests and exogenous 
support significantly influence the reward the model calculates for LH as it seeks 
to become a larger part of the Lebanese political process.  By understanding 
which of these are most important, we can suggest that these aspects of the 
model and current situation ought to receive special attention of policy makers 
and strategists.  The focused efforts of the state and defense departments would 
allow the U.S. and its allies to manipulate pressures to key actors and interests 
that would yield an outcome to the state space more favorable to Israel and the 
West. 
1. Scenario 1 
The impetus for varying each interest off the base case scenario to 
provide us with 10 alternate scenarios should now be evident.  We will be able to 
discern graphically which attributes of the model matter most through the 
application of tornado diagrams.  Table 11 contains the average reward for 
each scenario, with each value depicted using a standard ‘heat scale’. 
 
Table 11.   Scenario 1 results 
These results show that Scenarios 1.1a and 1.1b, wherein the interest of 
“protecting and providing services to the Shi’a within Lebanon” was varied, 
resulted in the most varied average expected payoff.  Scenarios 1.2a and 1.3b, 
relating to LH’s “militia capability,” are next in the order of magnitude difference 
from the base case.   
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We could continue our logic to intuitively identify the relative importance of 
each interest in Scenario 1, however, we will now employ the aforementioned 
tornado diagram.  In a tornado diagram, the length of the bar corresponding to 
each interest represents the extent to which the difference between expected 
payoffs is sensitive to the interest’s value as a variable.  The interest that is most 
sensitive to variation corresponds to that with longest bar span.  The least 
sensitive variable has the shortest bar span.   
  
Figure 17.   Tornado diagram for Scenarios 1 
From Figure 17’s plot of Scenario 1 and its variants, we can see that the 
difference between expected payoffs varies most greatly according to the value 
assigned to LH’s interest of “protecting and providing services to the Shi’a 
throughout Lebanon.”  The fact that this interest is the most material variable in 
terms of payoff is not altogether surprising, based on the opinions of the SMEs 
and where it was placed in the hierarchy of LH State Tree (first split in Figure 1). 
2. Scenario 2 
In the base case for the second set of scenarios, the values of each 
interest in every slice are equally important to LH.  Thus, all values for all 
interests are equal in the base case, then varied iteratively thereafter.  This is 
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done to part from reality and evenly assess the interaction of distributions with 
the values of interests.  The remaining 10 scenarios vary from their base case 
identically as in the case of scenario 1 and are shown in the data Tables 12 and 
13. 
 
Table 12.   Scenario 2 (base case for Scenario 2) 
  
Table 13.   Variations on Scenario 2 
GeNIe is used again to solve the network, with the same distributions as in 
Scenario 1.  Table 14 contains the average reward for each scenario. 
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Table 14.   Scenario 2 results 
The results from Scenario 2 show that Scenarios 2.2a and 2.2b, wherein 
the interest of “LH possessing a militia capability” was varied, resulted in the 
largest deviation from the base case in terms of expected reward.  Scenarios 
2.5a and 2.5b, where the interest of “LH controlling Lebanon” varied, resulted in 
the smallest deviation from the base case.  The tornado diagram, for the results 
shown in Table 14, are shown in Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Tornado diagram for Scenario 2 
The interests most sensitive to variations from the base case are ordered slightly 
differently than the results in Scenario 1.  LH’s interest in “possessing a militia 
capability” surpasses “LH protecting and providing services to the Shi’a in 
Lebanon.”  The third and fourth most important interest to the model similarly 
switch order, where “LH resisting Israel” surpasses “LH defending Lebanon.”  As 
in Scenario 1, “LH controlling Lebanon” is the least important interest. 
 55
3. Scenario 3 
In the third set of scenarios, the values of interests, are returned to their 
SME values.  The values of interests remain fixed in this third scenario and are 
not varied as before in Scenarios 1 and 2.  Instead, distributions will be varied by 
reducing their value by half (a), then by increasing their value by adding half the 
difference to 1 (b).  Tables 15–17 show the values for each of these scenarios.  
 





Table 16.   Variations on Scenario 3 
GeNIe is used once again to solve the network, using Scenario 1 as the fixed 
values for interests, but varying the distributions of interests as shown in Table 
16.  Table 17 contains the average reward for each scenario. 
  
Table 17.   Scenario 3 results  
Scenarios 3.1a and 3.1b, where the interest of “LH protecting and 
providing services to the Shi’a in Lebanon” are varied, result in the largest 
deviation from the base case.  The tornado diagram for the results shown in 
Table 17 is similar as that shown in Figure 19.  
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Figure 19.   Tornado diagram for Scenarios 3 
Figure 19 clearly shows that the distributions associated with “LH protecting and 
providing services to the Shi’a in Lebanon” are clearly the most important factor 
of the model.  
4. 2-Slice Model 
How might LH’s optimal strategy change if the model were reduced to 2 
slices?  This is akin to assuming LH might not be consumed with how the state 
space will evolve in three years, but rather just two—a slightly shorter-term 




Figure 20.   GeNIe implementation of 2-slice model 
We use the base case Scenarios 1 and 2 for this iteration of GeNIe solution to 
the model. 
 
Table 18.   2-slice model optimizing action at t=0 
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Table 19.   2-slice model optimizing action at t=1 
 
 
Table 20.   2-slice model reward node 
The optimal strategy, as calculated by GeNIe, for the 2-slice model 
suggests that in the first slice, LH would maximize its expected reward by 
“increasing illicit activities.”  In the second slice, no matter how the state space 
transitioned after the first slice, LH would invariably maximize its expected reward 
by “increasing outreach to the Lebanese Diaspora.”  Its optimal strategy, given by 
the reward node, is to “increase outreach to the Lebanese Diaspora” in t=1, 
regardless of the condition of the state space.  We thus have, for the 2-slice 
model, a similarly bleak forecast for improved relations for Israel and the West 




2-Slice Model: Optimal LH Strategy 
t=0: Increase illicit activities 
t=1: Increase outreach to the Lebanese Diaspora 
5. 1-Slice Model 
We repeat the process from the previous section, this time studying how 
the optimal strategy changes if the model were reduced to just 1-slice.  Such a 
model assumes that LH is only concerned with its immediate rewards, where it 
will be and how the state space will transition within 1 year.  We prune the ID 
again, as shown in Figure 21. 
  
Figure 21.   GeNIe implementation of 1-slice model 
We again use the base case Scenarios 1 and 2 for this iteration of GeNIe’s 
solution to the model. 
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Table 21.   1-slice model optimizing action at t=0 
 
Table 22.   1-slice model reward node 
LH’s optimal strategy for the 1-slice model is to “expand goods and 
services beyond the Shi’a in Lebanon.”  This model’s results is the most 
favorable in terms of the state space transitioning towards conditions that would 
facilitate improved relations with Israel and the West–provided LH would ever 
prove to be so short-sighted, and interested only in the rewards of the very near-
term. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This study provides a dynamic model for answering the UCC’s LH 
question.  The methodology and tools (DMAPS and GeNIe) employed to this end 
can be applied for the analysis of other stakeholders and their decision-making 
process. 
As in this and all models, the reliability of forecasted optimal strategies are 
directly related to the quality of the SME data input as the values and 
distributions that ultimately determine the behavior of the model.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. For Defense and Diplomacy Consideration 
It is clear, from the results and sensitivity analysis studied in Chapter IV, 
sections A.1 and B.1-2,  that the United States, Israel and the West ought to 
invest in understanding how they might be able to fulfill LH’s interest of 
“protecting and providing services to the Shi’a in Lebanon.”  Also, being able to 
affect LH’s propensity to “develop a closer relationship with Iran” and for LH to 
“increase its outreach to the Lebanese Diaspora” may affect the actions LH 
decides to take in effort to maximize its reward.  Such understanding, further 
modeling, and eventual application of force, diplomacy or economic persuasions 
may in fact enable the West to mold the state space and the actions LH takes to 
achieve more favorable and peaceful conditions in the Middle East. 
2. Future Work 
Due to time constraints and the capacity of the operating memory of 
computer software, this study provided a dynamic model and analysis for one of 
two key questions the UCC has regarding LH.  The second question, “How will 
 64
Syria’s potential/likely decisions and actions affect their relationship with LH?” 
adds a dimension to the methodology used in thesis’ LH question: the two player-
game.  While the same principles of game theory and decision analysis  were 
applied, in this thesis can be applied to a two-stakeholder dynamic model. The 
dimensionality involved and the software computing requirements, will require 
further study and development. 
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